Clinical review: Tokyo – protecting the health care worker during a chemical mass casualty event: an important issue of continuing relevance by Okumura, Sumie et al.
397 ICU = intensive care unit; PPE = personal protective equipment.
Available online http://ccforum.com/content/9/4/397
Abstract
Determine the effectiveness of decontamination, and perform
thorough dry or wet decontamination, depending on the
circumstances. Always remain cognizant of the fact that, even after
decontamination has been completed, contamination may not have
been completely eliminated. Perform periodic monitoring to
determine whether secondary exposure has occurred in health care
workers; if it appears that secondary exposure has occurred, then
the PPE level must be increased and attempts must be made to
identify and eliminate the source of the contamination. Finally, if the
victims were exposed through ingestion, then consider the
possibility that secondary exposure will occur during gastric lavage.
Introduction
In the Tokyo subway sarin attack in March 1995, many health
care workers experienced secondary exposure [1]. Although the
various organizations that responded to the incident were aware
that the causative agent was a chemical substance, many cases
of secondary exposure occurred because of lack of sufficient
knowledge of the decontamination and protective measures that
needed to be implemented. This article discusses aspects
related to the secondary exposure that occurred in the 1995
subway incident in Tokyo, and reviews the measures that health
care workers must implement to protect themselves in the event
of a chemical mass casualty incident.
Secondary exposure in the Tokyo subway
sarin attack
No primary decontamination was performed at the scene of
the Tokyo subway sarin attack. In addition, the first responders
and the health care workers involved in the initial response
were not wearing personal protective equipment (PPE). As a
result, 135 (9.9%) of the 1364 fire department personnel who
responded to the incident experienced secondary exposure
while transporting victims to emergency facilities [2]. Although
the extent of secondary exposure among police department
personnel has not been made public, it is thought to have
been similar to that observed among fire department
personnel. Fortunately, no lives were lost due to secondary
exposure because the purity of the sarin used in the Tokyo
subway attack was only approximately 30%. It is thought that
the use of sarin of low concentration was because the group
responsible for the attack – the Aum Shinrikyo cult – received
information on a police investigation into their activities, which
they intended to disrupt by launching the attack. The short
time period between the planning and execution of the attack
meant that the concentration of the sarin used was relatively
low. In contrast, nearly pure sarin was used in the Matsumoto
sarin attack [3,4] in 1994. If high-purity sarin had also been
used in the Tokyo attack then lives might have been lost due
to secondary exposure.
In the Tokyo subway attack secondary exposure also
occurred at medical facilities [1,5]. As a result of its proximity
to the subway station where many of the victims were
exposed to the agent, St. Luke’s International Hospital
received 640 victims on the day of the incident. A survey
conducted at St. Luke’s after the incident found that 23% of
the hospital staff experienced secondary exposure [1]. The
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rates of secondary exposure by occupation were 39.3% in
nursing assistants, 26.5% in nurses, 25.5% in volunteers,
21.8% in doctors and 18.2% in clerks. It is thus apparent that
the extent of secondary exposure among individuals
increased in proportion to the duration and degree of physical
contact they had with victims.
The rate of secondary exposure at various locations was
45.8% in the hospital chapel, 38.7% in the intensive care unit
(ICU), 32.4% in the outpatient department, 17.7% in the
ward and 16.7% in the emergency department. The low
number of individuals who experienced secondary exposure
in the emergency department was attributed to the fact that
the staff in this area were breathing outdoor air and the
ventilation in the department was extraordinarily high, given
that the automatic doors at the ambulance entrance were
often open because of the continuous arrival of victims.
Conversely, the high incidence of secondary exposure in the
chapel was attributed to the fact that the air circulation in the
chapel had never been good and because many victims were
received there. The incident occurred during the winter, and
the victims were received at the chapel wearing the same
clothes that they had been wearing at the time of the attack. It
is thus likely that whenever an overcoat was removed or a
person was moved, sarin trapped in, or under, the person’s
clothing escaped, resulting in secondary exposure.
Eventually, victims were asked to remove their clothing if
possible, and it was stored in plastic bags. Although these
measures could be implemented for most of the patients who
were hospitalized, it could not always be done for those
victims who went home after undergoing a series of standard
outpatient test observations [1].
That 38.7% of personnel in the hospital ICU experienced
secondary exposure at the time of the Tokyo attack is a
shocking finding. Severely injured victims may be exposed to
higher levels of the causative agent than victims who suffer
mild injury, and those with severe injuries are naturally
brought to the ICU. The likelihood that patients in the ICU will
become contaminated with the causative agent is therefore
greater. The likelihood of such an occurrence should be
clearly recognized, and measures should be conceived to
cope with such circumstances in the event that they occur.
Intensivists, even more than emergency physicians, should
always be mindful and prepared to implement mitigation
measures to ensure their own safety in a chemical mass
casualty event.
Mass decontamination
Based on the lessons learned from the Tokyo incident, the
effectiveness of the emergency services and their response
to such an incident can be improved by addressing issues
related to the decontamination of victims and by donning
PPE. Fire department personnel should cordon off the site of
the incident in cooperation with the police, and should
decontaminate victims because this is an essential and
important prerequisite for protecting medical facilities from
contamination. Irrespective of the skill of the emergency
services or the spatial extent of the emergency itself,
cordoning off the area and establishing a decontamination
system at the site is likely to take at least 30 min. By this time,
victims will begin to arrive at medical facilities in waves, either
under their own power or assisted by the drivers of taxis or
private cars who happened to be passing and offered help.
The more severely injured the victims are, the greater the
urgency will be to get them to medical facilities, but the more
likely will it be that they are insufficiently decontaminated. This
risk varies from country to country, and depends on factors as
varied as the extent to which physicians are involved at the
site of such emergencies and the range of medical care that
paramedics are allowed to administer [6].
Consequently, decontamination at medical facilities is
necessary, but the capacity to administer mass casualty
chemical decontamination at medical facilities is inadequate
throughout the world [7–10]. There is an urgent need to
respond quickly after the onset of such incidents, even if the
causative agent, its characteristics (whether it is a solid,
liquid, gas, chemical splash, or aerosol) and its concentration
are unknown. If the contamination can clearly be seen with
the unaided eye or if irritation suggestive of a blistering agent
is present at the sites of exposure, then decontamination with
water (wet decontamination) should probably be performed.
In other cases, the victims’ clothing should be removed (dry
decontamination) at least (Fig. 1). Each hospital must
establish an area for victims to change their clothing, with
replacement clothes prepared in advance. Ideally, a monitor
should be used to confirm that the causative agent has been
effectively removed by the decontamination process.
However, chemical weapons monitors are expensive and they
require skill to operate and maintain. Moreover, the addition of
monitoring to the decontamination process risks reducing the
efficiency of decontamination. Consequently, it is impractical
for a medical facilities to purchase such equipment [11]. In
Japan only a few university hospitals with advanced
emergency medical centres have chemical monitors such as
the ChemPro 100® (Environics, Mikkeli, Finland). If the facility
is uncertain regarding whether all of the contaminants were
removed in the decontamination process, and it appears that
health care workers may be subjected to secondary
exposure, then the possibility of incomplete decontamination
must not be ruled out.
Personal protective equipment
The use of PPE is as important as decontamination itself. PPE
is mainly used in the receiving and decontamination areas in
hospital settings. Many reports in the literature have asserted
that the use of level C protective equipment (ambient air is
adsorbed and filtered using an absorbent cartridge to protect
the respiratory tract) is adequate for medical facilities
[6,11,12]. However, use of level C equipment is pointless if
the causative agent is a gas that is not absorbed by the399
cartridge; for instance, such devices may not be able to filter
out carbon monoxide, or they may not be capable of the heavy
metal doping of activated charcoal required to remove
cyanides. Consequently, some investigators have expressed
concern about the safety of using level C protective
equipment, noting that the chemical weapons used by
terrorists are not limited to known agents [11].
Therefore, there is currently no global consensus regarding
the level of PPE that should be used at medical facilities
[12–14]. Conversely, the filter cartridges that are used for
civilian PPE applications were developed by the military to
filter out all known agents of chemical warfare and major civil
toxic hazards. In fact, military forces all over the world use
level C protection; this is because the balloon-like level A
suits with their air cylinders represent potential targets on the
battlefield. Similarly, the US Occupational Safety and Health
Administration recommends use of a powered air-purifying
respirator (a form of level C PPE) in hospital settings.
Given that an attack on a society’s weak points is by
definition an act of terrorism, it is important to focus on those
areas and develop worst case scenarios accordingly.
Consequently, level C PPE is likely to be sufficient for most
hospital settings (receiving and decontamination areas).
However, if health care workers responding to an incident
exhibit symptoms, then level B protective equipment, which
provides a higher level of protection, should be used until the
source of the contamination can be identified. Level B
equipment either has an air cylinder or it has an air hose that
enables fresh air to be obtained from an air supply. It is
recommended that medical facilities use the air line type PPE,
to which air is supplied through a hose, because the use and
maintenance of air cylinder PPE requires training.
Furthermore, nearly all medical facilities are already equipped
with lines for compressed air, making it practical to use air
line type PPE in hospitals.
There are two types of air line type PPE. In one type
compressed air is blown continuously into the hood, whereas
in the other compressed air is delivered by a mask with a
regulator that supplies air on demand. Although the former
type permits easier breathing and is safe, it consumes
140 l/min compressed air, placing a burden on the
compressed air lines in the hospital. An excessive burden on
the compressed air lines could adversely affect mechanical
ventilators and other devices that also use the lines. The
pressure demand type level B PPE is somewhat more
expensive than the continuous supply air line type, and
requires the user to be trained to fit the mask. However, it
only consumes 40 l/min air and imposes lesser burden on the
compressed air system as a whole.
Depending on the circumstances of the facility, either of
these level B PPE types should be obtained and prepared for
use. Notwithstanding, it is important to remember that level B
PPE carries inherent dangers for the wearer. One potential
disadvantage is that the time taken to put on the equipment
can be considerable, and the system may become
contaminated before staff are protected. Some hospitals
have introduced level B PPE in Japan.
Secondary poisoning of medical personnel by a toxic gas was
recently reported in Japan when toxic agents reacted with
gastric acid during a gastric lavage procedure conducted in a
patient who had ingested a toxic substance [15,16]. The
episode raised awareness of the necessity for PPE, and
closed gastric lavage kits are now commonly employed in
Japan when gastric lavage is performed. When sodium azide,
cyanides, sulfides and arsenious acid react with gastric acid,
hydrogen azide, hydrogen cyanide, hydrogen sulfide and
arsine, respectively, are produced. (Of these compounds,
hydrogen azide, for example, cannot be absorbed by
absorbent cartridges and is thus used to produce chemical
weapons.) Although the term ‘chemical terrorism’ currently
implies terrorism involving chemical weapons, it also has
become necessary to guard against chemical terrorism
involving the intentional contamination of food and drink with
lethal chemical substances. For the terrorist, such methods
are easier to execute than other means of disseminating a
chemical agent. This underscores the need for precautions
against secondary exposure during gastric lavage.
Protection of health care workers in the
intensive care unit
It is necessary to confirm whether appropriate decontamina-
tion has been undertaken at the site of the incident or where
the victims are received (such as the site of one of the
services). As mentioned above, a monitor should ideally be
used to confirm the extent of decontamination, but this is
usually not practical and the efficacy of decontamination is
thus not established in this manner. Consequently, rather
than assuming that decontamination was complete, periodic
monitoring should be performed to determine whether
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Figure 1
Practical decontamination strategy. Adapted from the Decontamination
Manual (the official report of the Task Force on the advanced procedures
of fire righters by the Japanese National Fire Defense Agency, 2004).
Primary triage
Walkable ('able to walk')             Unwalkable ('unable to walk')
Causative agent:  Invisible      Visible or                    Invisible      Visible or
                                               skin irritation (+)                              skin irritation (+)
Self-service dry decon    Self-service showering        Dry decon           Wet decon
Priority:   4                                          3                                   2                          1400
secondary exposure has occurred among health care workers.
If it appears that secondary exposure has occurred, then the
level of protection among emergency workers should be
increased and the source of the contamination determined. In
the event of a terrorist attack using chemicals, ICUs are likely to
receive severely injured patients from emergency rooms in
rapid succession, and appropriate precautions should be taken
in such cases [17]. Expired air should be processed using a
mechanical ventilation system [6]. However, unlike most
operating theatres, ICUs often do not have ventilation systems
that are designed to remove excess gas. Consequently,
measures such as attaching a reservoir to the air outlet and
emptying the reservoir by continuous suction should be
implemented in the event of a chemical mass casualty event.
Conclusion
The following is a summary of the methods that can be
employed to protect health care workers during a chemical
mass casualty event. Determine the effectiveness of
decontamination, and perform thorough dry or wet
decontamination, depending on the circumstances. Always
remain cognizant of the fact that, even after decontamination
has been completed, contamination may not have been
completely eliminated. Perform periodic monitoring to
determine whether secondary exposure has occurred in
health care workers; if it appears that secondary exposure
has occurred, then the PPE level must be increased and
attempts must be made to identify and eliminate the source of
the contamination. Finally, if the victims were exposed
through ingestion, then consider the possibility that
secondary exposure will occur during gastric lavage.
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